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Empirical Realities This Page Intentionally Left Blank11  Adjustment in Process: 
A Lancashire Town 
Ronald P. Dore 
This paper is an interim report from a field study. It concerns the struc- 
ture of industry in the former textile town of  Blackburn: how, why, and in 
what manner are textiles going downhill? What is going uphill, and why? 
The focus of  the research  is on one particular  kind of  adjustment 
problem-that  arising from the dynamics of trade between the NICs (and 
subsequent generations of  NICs) and OICs. The assumptions, positive 
and normative, on which the investigation is based are as follows: 
1. As in the Bhagwati paper (chapter 6), which takes the same focus, 
there are assumed to be in  the OICs (A) one set of  (manufacturing) 
industries which  are losing domestic markets to imports because the 
NICs’ potential comparative advantage from differential wage rates is 
being increasingly realized as the NICs learn by doing (and by studying); 
these are industries well advanced in the product cycle, where learning by 
doing and studying is easier; (B) another “Schumpeterian” set (mostly 
manufacturing, some services) at an earlier stage of the product cycle in 
which the OKs  retain comparative advantage in international trade and 
where productivity growth is more rapid and hence from whose expan- 
sion the OKs  have most to gain in terms of growth in per capita national 
income (NI); as well as (C) an intermediate range of industries not clearly 
in either category, including, of  course, poodle clipping and discos and 
retailing and emergency wards which provide non-internationally traded 
goods and services. 
Ronald P. Dore is a Fellow of the Institute of  Development Studies at the University of 
Sussex and a distinguished sociologist. Most of  his work has been on Japanese society and 
comparative  patterns of  development. He is the author of British Factory-Japanese  Factory 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973). 
Much  of  the  information in  this  paper was collected  by  the author’s collaborators, 
Geoffrey Shepherd, Gillian McHugh, and Jill Eaton, though they deserve the usual absolu- 
tion from any responsibility for any use of it. 
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2.  It is assumed that the sort of  dynamic change which would take 
place in the OICs in the absence of  any market distortions except trade 
union protection  of  wage levels would be roughly: Increasing import 
penetration in the domestic markets of A industries leads to the follow- 
ing: (a)  employment declines (wages do not drop) in OIC A industries; 
(b)  a consumer surplus is generated in OICs from the purchase of cheaper 
imports; (c)  demand in the exporting NICs increases for imports of  the 
OICs’ B industries; (d)  the consumer surplus and the NIC demand both 
stimulate expansion in B and C industries, which absorb the labor re- 
leased from the A industries; (e) the increased exports of  OIC B indus- 
tries to NICs balances the external accounts to pay for increased imports. 
3. Some such outcome is assumed to be desirable. More specifically, 
for all the reasons about shared interests in world stability and prosperity 
set out in the Brandt (1980) report, we assume that the policy objectives 
of  OIC governments should also give very positive weighting to the 
welfare gains accruing to the NICs from this process. 
4. But to ask that, in order to achieve this desirable outcome, market 
forces should be let rip is to ask for the moon. Most modern societies do 
not work like that. In Europe at least, in Japan, and increasingly in the 
United States, the political clout of  the interest groups who lose in the 
process of  writing off  the A industries is too great to let it happen. 
5. The only way to move toward this desirable outcome therefore is to 
buy off  the opposition. 
6. One can also (Diamond’s debate, beginning in section 5.5) find 
arguments from justice for doing so on the following lines: Current world 
norms concerning what citizens have a right to demand of governments 
have come to include the right to the protection of  jobs against import 
competition. The entrepreneur who goes bankrupt or the worker who 
loses his job because the government fails to offer such protection has, on 
this argument, a claim to more consideration than someone who reaches 
the same plight through his own inefficiency. 
7. But how best to provide the compensation? How will  such com- 
pensation best (a)  provide an inducement not to resist the run-down of 
theA industries, (b)  produce the least frictional hurt from that run-down, 
with (c)  the most just graduation of hurt to compensation and (d)  at the 
same time optimizing distribution of the incremental flow of  capital and 
labor, respectively, as between the B and C industries? The best way to 
work toward an answer to those questions, we thought, was by talking to 
people currently affected by the process. Our specific questions are: 
-When  a textile entrepreneur is faced (not just because of  import 
competition but because of any noncyclical secular change) with a declin- 
ing market and the prospect of  nonviability, what factors enter into his 
choice between closing down, rationalizing to cut costs and stay competi- 
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how far do his relations with his workers and with his workers’ unions 
constrain those decisions? 
-Assuming  that he would see any one of  those three alternatives as 
inferior  to  getting  government  protection  through  the  exercise  of 
“voice,” what systematic factors affect his likely success in doing so? 
-Some  enterprises retain their market shares and remain profitable 
even in the face of import competition; what are the specific products, or 
processes, or managing or marketing styles, which differentiate these 
firms from those that go under? 
-What  are the differences between the small family firm and the large 
corporation in these various respects? 
-Who  suffers from an industry’s decline, and in what way and how 
much? How easily are people’s skills and capital assets redeployed? What 
material and psychic costs do people incur in  getting new jobs  and 
perhaps homes? What are the secondary effects on commerce and ser- 
vices in towns where a contracting industry is concentrated? 
-What  are the new enterprises that expand employment as the A 
industry contracts? Are there any observable “phoenix” micromecha- 
nisms whereby the new firms arise directly from the ashes of  the old, 
directly utilizing resources released by the decline of the old (which might 
give clues as to useful types of  state intervention)? 
For a variety of reasons fairly obvious from the nature of the questions 
(including, apropos of  entrepreneurs’ decision making, the hypothesis 
that local factors, not just the state of  national markets, probably enter 
into their calculations) the study concentrates on the weaving industry in 
a single town, Blackburn. 
11.1  Recent Trends 
Textiles in Blackburn have been in steady decline since the days, at the 
beginning of  the century, when Lancashire supplied the home market 
before breakfast and spent the rest of  the day clothing the remainder of 
the empire. In the town itself the 140  weaving mills of the early 1930s  have 
contracted to a mere dozen, with another dozen in the outskirts, but in 
the same travel-to-work area. Textiles, having accounted for more than 
half of  total employment half a century ago, made up 12 percent of total 
employment and 23 percent of  employment in manufacturing in  1973 
(Blackburn travel-to-work area as a whole), 10 percent and 20 percent, 
respectively, in 1976, and doubtless even less today. Close to 15 percent 
of  the jobs remaining in weaving in November  1979 were lost in the 
following eight months, and the number of  unemployed former textile 
workers rose from 225 to 824. This acceleration of decline was brought 
about not by  competition from Third World countries (which is held 
steady by the MFA) but by the general recession sharply exacerbated by a 298  Ronald P. Dore 
combination of overvalued pound, high interest rates, and stronger com- 
petition from the European periphery (Rumania, Turkey, Greece, Por- 
tugal) less restrained by quota restrictions and aided by taste changes. 
(Foreign producers responded more rapidly to the growing demand for 
denims and corduroys: new competitors snatch new markets more easily 
than they erode old ones.) 
Firms which have recently closed or undergone major, reduced-scale 
reorganization include the following: 
1. A  velvet  manufacturer  (155  employees,  branch  of  a  French, 
medium-sized enterprise) producing 90 cm widths, losing its markets to 
German competitors producing the 150 cm widths preferred by garment 
makers. Is marking time with one-day-a-week working pending decisions 
about reequipment . 
2.  A plant  (430 employees) of  large corporation A  specializing in 
woven mattress ticking made on Jacquard looms. Progressively  lost mar- 
kets to products of a newer, cheaper, stitch-bonded process. Has reequip- 
ped to produce polyester-cotton sheeting for markets now rapidly being 
invaded by United States imports. 
3.  A family firm (200 employees) weaving cotton-synthetic mixes for 
outer garments in what is claimed to be temporary trouble because of  (a) 
some reduction of  orders due to recession and (b)  some delayed pur- 
chases due to converters’ unwillingness to hold stocks at a time of  high 
interest rates. But the owners have recently floated a new merchanting 
enterprise to import cloth for sale to converters and garment makers. 
4.  A plant  (850 employees) of  large corporation A  specializing in 
crease-resistent  cotton-synthetic  mixes  for  garments with  their  own 
brand-named cloth. In trouble for five or six years because of  fashion 
switch to denims, and imports of  ready-made suitings chiefly from Por- 
tugal, Rumania, and the United States. A reconstruction plan under- 
taken in 1978 involving reequipment and new ventures in women’s wear 
foundered in 1979. Factory closed. 
5. A former family firm (130 employees) taken over in 1963 by large 
corporation B,  but run as an independent unit by former owner. Special- 
ized in curtain fabrics woven on Jacquard looms. Like 2 above, faced with 
gradually narrowing markets  as  a result  of  Competition from  stitch- 
bonded prints. Closed and remaining business transferred to sister mill in 
Yorkshire, 1980. 
6. A former family firm (80 employees) acquired some time ago by a 
medium-sized Manchester firm of converters and garment makers. Wove 
a variety of cloth, mainly industrial, on 1890-vintage Lancashire looms 
driven on direct drive by an even older steam engine. Had barely survived 
in recent years, in spite of  import competition driving down prices, by 
virtue of  lower than average wages, refusal to countenance any major 
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rary employment subsidy. Ending of the subsidy and imminent need for 
several major items of  capital expenditure (new pirn winders, major 
repair to steam engine) precipitated closure 1979. 
What  have we  so far learned from our interviews concerning the 
determinants  of  the  choice  between  rationalizing,  diversifying,  or 
closing? 
11.2  The Rationalizing Option: General 
For the family firms, the time for choice between the “hanging-on” 
option 6 above and the “fight-back” option 3 is long since past. No one 
would now put large infusions of  capital into Mill 6: it could survive as 
long as it did only because all its fixed assets had long been written down 
to zero and it had to cover only (day shift) wages, material costs, and 
interest on working capital.  Mill 3 started reequipping with modern 
shuttleless looms, exploited by  three-shift working, in the 1960s when 
prospects were better: it has been able to reequip with later vintages 
every four or five years (a)  because it had good secondhand machines to 
sell and (6) because of the liberal capital depreciation allowance system 
available to British firms generally (for machinery, not buildings), which 
permits the entrepreneur to choose his own pattern of  depreciation- 
even  100 percent allowances in the first year with any resulting loss 
making it possible to claim tax refunds on any profits of the preceeding 
three years. 
Other ingredients of  Mill 3’s survival strategy were: 
a) Improved marketing, concentrating on flexibly picking up (albeit 
small) orders for new or difficult types of cloth of the kind it is not worth 
ordering, or not possible to order, from  a distant foreign producer; 
capitalizing also, where possible, on converters’ and garment makers’ 
buy-British patriotism (one major retail chain uses its buy-British patriot- 
ism as an element in its advertising), and on their prudent concern to keep 
some local suppliers available in case the Suez Canal blows up. 
b)  Improved labor productivity-most  recently in the case of  Mill 3 by 
the importation of  a  Pakistani-Swiss production  engineer  (borrowed 
from the machine suppliers) who by a combination of  machine debug- 
ging, work reorganization, and task analysis provided the rationale for 
reduced manning (which still, according to the management’s not disin- 
terested calculations, leaves them 15 to 30 percent overmanned as far as 
overlookers were concerned as compared with European firms using 
identical machines). This was accepted after much bargaining between 
the workers, union, and management in return for increases in wages 
(partly in the form of a productivity bonus) and a compromise settlement 
over the management’s demand, apropos of  the skilled men, that it, 
rather than the unions and workers, should decide which workers might 300  Ronald P. Dore 
stay and which go. This made Mill 3’s wages the highest in the district- 
for knotters, for example, 36 percent above the wages of the lowest-wage 
firm among the thirty-seven in the district covered by the relevant union 
branch (f94.71 and f69.40 per week). 
In inflationary periods, of  course, wage leaders which become wage 
leaders in order to get their work force to accept changes they would 
otherwise resist are able to slip back in succeeding years by  lesser in- 
creases, though Mill 3’s management believes that its ability to select 
efficient workers and to demand efficient performance depends on its 
reputation as a high-wage mill. 
11.3  The Rationalization Option: Wage Cuts 
Actual money wage cuts seem never to be part of  a rationalization 
policy (except that in the case of Mill 1,  when the mill went onto one-day- 
a-week short time, laying off the manual workers at 75 percent of regular 
wages paid  for by  a government  short-time working subsidy, skilled 
workers, employed under guaranteed-salary staff conditions, agreed to 
take a 10 percent cut). Real wages can be eroded over time, however, by 
failure to compensate fully for inflation. The norm-setting wage agree- 
ment between the national (in effect Lancashire) Federation and the 
Textile Employers Association (and the similar agreement between the 
Employers’ Association and the Overlookers who preserve their superior 
craft standing by remaining outside the Federation) provides for general 
increases. The agreement for a 14 percent increase in the 1980 round (at a 
time when consumer price inflation was approaching 20 percent) seems to 
have been generally implemented. But this represented an increase on 
wage structures which have come to vary from mill to mill as a result of ad 
hoc bargains negotiated by the district secretaries (full-time union men 
and women) of the respective craft unions-the  Weavers, the Overlook- 
ers, the Knotters, the Tapers, and the Warehousemen. Even for the craft 
skills with fixed time payments, the high-wage firms may pay 40 percent 
more than the lowest, and for weavers in particular the complexities of 
the piecework systems used, weighting a basic ‘‘x pence per 1,000  picks” 
principle by a variety of adjustments for types of cloth, do not allow an 
easy ex ante comparison of  wages when rates are fixed-hence  the even 
greater variety of  ex post wage packets. 
The scope for cutting real wages, however, is limited. Mills 4 and 6, 
especially the “hanging-on” Mill 6,  have been low-wage firms in recent 
years. Both were in small outlying communities on the town’s outskirts 
with no alternative employers nearby, and they were able to retain such 
workers as they did retain thanks to a strong walk-to-work preference, 
and in the case of  Mill 6 in part by  the persistence of  noncontractual 
managerial-discretionary elements in the wage. As the former manager 
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Some of the cloth would be slower weaving+oarse  counts, say, with a 
lot of changes of pirn, so you’d go to the weaver and you’d say: “Do this 
one for me love, and I’ll see you right at the end of  the week.” And 
she’d say: “Oh, you will, will you. How much you going to give me, 
then?” And I’d say, “Oh threppence!”. “I’ll see you dead first,” she’d 
say, but she’d do it and then, say, you’d slip an extra three quid into the 
wage at the end of  the week. 
The jocular exchange serves as a substitute for contractual bargaining, 
preserving  the manager’s discretionary authority, but  making allow- 
ance-at  the verbal level-for  the worker’s egalitarian pride. It also 
inhibits exchange of information by workers about their wage levels and 
reduces wage predictability. 
The low-wage firms did, however, suffer from a shortage of  skilled 
workers. The inability to fill overlooker vacancies meant that Mill 6 was 
operating only 140 of its 288 working looms for its final half year. (Several 
Blackburn overlookers left the industry for engineering in that period: 
four, from Mill 4, to work in textiles in Sudan.) Managers at Mill 4, the 
other low-wage firm (larger and with much more rationalized, impersonal 
wage systems), also complained that the Overlookers’ Union would not 
help them to fill vacancies, and complained further of the low quality of 
their weaver labor and of high turnover (47 percent in the twelve months 
preceding closure) and high absenteesim (12 percent). This they ascribed 
largely to the fact that the sickly smell of impending doom has attended 
the textile industry for so long that few young people have been attracted 
into it except reluctantly through family connections, because of  next- 
door convenience, or because they could not find better jobs.  In the 
larger  mills  there  were  frequent  complaints  of  sloppy  work,  bad 
timekeeping, absenteeism, “leaving as soon as we’ve finally got them 
trained  to  a  reasonable  standard,”  losing  orders  because  “we  just 
couldn’t meet the Swedish quality requirements for the aircraft blinds: 
you can’t get workers to take that much trouble.” In the smaller mills, 
where such complaints gave way to praise for “a fine lot of workers,” the 
average age was relatively high.  (Of the total 454 ex-textile workers 
unemployed in the Blackburn area in February 1980, 40 percent were 
over forty.) 
11.4  The Rationalization Option: Immigrants 
The “Bhagwati option”-survival  by  importing immigrant labor-is 
not necessary for Blackburn employers since the immigrants are already 
there. A good many, from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, have been 
there for twenty  years.  They  do not  seem to represent  a low-wage 
alternative work force since they are paid union rates and there are no 
segregated jobs-i.e.,  no job rates which apply only to Asians let alone to 
all Asians.  However, in  marginal matters of  interpretations of  rates, 302  Ronald P. Dore 
willingness to accept cuts in conventionalized overtime working, etc., 
their vulnerability may make them a cost advantage. (As a community 
relations  official put it, “They  are a very accepting community-not 
looking for trouble: easily satisfied with the treatment  dished out to 
them.”) And they do clearly represent a low-wage alternative in one 
respect. They predominate on the (permanent) night shift of many facto- 
ries, and it is generally agreed that even with current (7 percent) unem- 
ployment levels in Blackburn it would be impossible to man the night 
shift without them. This is spoken of as if  it were not a question of wages, 
but of work attitudes: native born are “not that desperate for money that 
they are willing to work nights.” More realistically one might say that the 
night shift premium (currently 25 to 30 percent depending on the factory) 
would have had to have been bid up to some considerable degree to 
attract suitable workers from other industries, certainly five years ago 
when unemployment rates were 2 to 3 percent, and perhaps even now 
when they are much higher. 
The proportion of  Asian workers varies widely between factories for 
reasons which seem wholly idiosyncratic and largely to have to do with 
the levels of  racial prejudice  of  managers or key white workers,  the 
success of early Asian employees in establishing rapport with supervisors 
and bringing in friends, etc. No systematic correlation with any economic 
parameters has been discerned. 
11.5  The Rationalization Option: Labor Flexibility 
Differences between types of looms, of yarn used, and of type of weave 
so much affect the volume and structure of minimally necessary tasks that 
it is difficult to compare manning ratios from mill to mill, but it is our 
impression that there exists a considerable difference between the most 
tightly and the most loosely manned firms. Tight manning seems often to 
be the result of improvisation to cover unfilled vacancies rather than of 
deliberate rationalization. Production planning to avoid peak bunching 
of  some key tasks (“gating”  new  beams, knotting the ends, etc.) on 
several looms at once is technically difficult to do effectively, and the 
alternative of  comfortable staffing to take care of  peaks even though 
some workers are often less than fully employed has obvious attractions. 
Other limits to the ease with which productivity levels can be raised by 
reducing manning include (a)  indivisibilities and (b)  skill demarcations. 
As for the first, the number of  looms per weaver is difficult to increase 
marginally because of physical layout. Where the looms are banked in 
rows of ten, it is possible to go from ten per weaver to fifteen per weaver 
(if a change in the type of loom use could justify such a large jump), but to 303  Adjustment Processes, Assistance Policies, and Political Response 
go from ten to twelve or thirteen causes problems. In Mill 2 with the 
switch from Jacquard multicolor weaving to simpler sheeting materials 
which justified a shift from ten to eighteen looms per weaver, the whole 
factory layout had to be altered. 
Skill demarcations are described as less of a problem than they used to 
be. The trades with traditional  apprenticeship schemes--overlookers, 
beamers, tapers, and sizers-were  traditionally jealously protective of 
their status as skilled “time-served” men. Their unions would not allow 
managers to promote, for example, weavers to such jobs even though 
they had informally acquired adequate competence. This is now largely a 
thing of  the past: the sense of  a shared interest in keeping ailing firms 
afloat-and  the sense that most are ailing+ombined  with the steady 
increase in the number of skilled men who prefer exit to voice, has much 
reduced these difficulties. 
Nevertheless, in a very traditional industry, even small measures of 
work intensification-in  one instance expecting weavers to do their own 
creeling (linking up the cones of  thread  to feed the automatic pirn- 
windersemeet with disgruntled resistance, and compliance usually has 
to be “bought.” When Mill 2 went over to sheeting with eighteen looms 
per weaver, groups of  workers were sent to another of  the firm’s mills 
where the system was already in operation to observe its working. A 
number of meetings were held, culminating in a mass meeting addressed 
by  the group managing director. The workers finally agreed to a six- 
month trial period during which they were guaranteed as a minimum 
their average earnings of  the previous six months. 
“Negotiation costs” thus remain a not negligible factor in entrepre- 
neurial decision making, but they need not be too high for managers with 
the right approach. One mill in the outskirts had achieved an effective 
piece  of  rationalization  not  yet  found  elsewhere.  A  single group  of 
workers rotated (both within and between shifts) between weaving and 
cloth-inspecting jobs. The mill was, significantly, part of  a larger group 
with a profit-sharing scheme and an intricate system of  councils which 
ensured a form of  managerial accountability to the rank-and-file “part- 
ners”-the  firm’s employees-and  this gave a special character to manag- 
er-worker relations. For example, one possible problem of the new work 
arrangement-that  weavers might subsequently have to inspect their own 
cloth-was  solved by the “moral incentive” device of getting them to sign 
the tickets  which  accompanied the cloth out  of  the factory.  As the 
recession deepened in the summer of  1980 this was one of  the few mills 
still working at capacity, though how far this can be attributed to its “high 
trust” labor management policy, how much to its vertical integration with 
a chain of department stores or to the strength of its relatively up-market 
product lines, we were unable to judge. 304  Ronald P. Dore 
11.6  The Rationalization Option: The Multiplant Corporation 
In appearance and ethos, there was more than a half-century jump 
from Mill 6 with its mid-nineteenth-century steam engine, leaky water 
lodge, and 1890s looms in tumbledown premises, to multinational A’s 
Mill 4  with its carpeted reception area complete with pretty receptionist, 
tropical fish tank, leather armchairs, and coffee table magazines-und  its 
expensive reequipment program only a year ahead of its decision to close. 
The differences are particularly important, given the high degree of 
ownership concentration in the United Kingdom textile industry.’ The 
ability to concentrate financial  resources at strategic points, probably also 
access to finance on favorable terms (and the security of  knowing that 
British governments in the 1970s do not allow firms with 30,000 workers 
to go bankrupt), makes for a relatively bold approach to capital invest- 
ment schemes-with  a little bit left over for a fish tank to emphasize the 
break with Protestant ethic-type penny-pinching asceticism. 
The large corporations can also take closure decisions with greater 
ruthlessness and at an earlier stage in the decline process than in the case 
of a family firm. The board which takes the decision (and which may well 
do so against the strenuous pleadings of the mill manager) does not have 
its financial vision much obscured by ties of  local sentiment. Second, the 
remaining business and much of  the still valuable equipment-those 
grounds of tenuous optimism which prompt the family firm owner to hold 
on in hopes of something turning up-can  be transferred to another plant 
of the same firm. This happened with both Mills 4 and 5, each of which 
had counterparts within their respective grousp. Courtaulds, the group 
which owned Mill 5,  indeed, was reported in July 1980 to have closed 50 
of  its 350 plants and made 12,000 workers redundant in the preceding 
year.  Its chairman declared  his intention  to give full priority  to the 
development of nontextile interests (including  paint, plastics, packaging, 
etc.), to concentrate resources on the strongest businesses, rather than to 
“squander them in areas of  long-term weakness” (Guardian, 25 July 
1980). 
Hearsay explanations of  why Mills 4 and 5 were closed rather than 
other plants within the group did not suggest that rigorous performance 
analyses played a major role.  In one case the counterpart had been 
acquired by the group only two years before for a considerable sum, and 
“the shareholders would have started asking awkward questions if  we 
closed that down, although it was probably the less efficient of the two.” 
In the other case, the two main factors were said to be, first, that the 
closed mill was in a newer, more marketable building; second, that the 
survivor mill to which most of its business was transferred was fairly close 
to another mill of  the group and so could share certain management 
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11.7  The Rationalization Option: Management Quality 
One does not get the impression that managers either of  the smaller 
firms or of  the plants owned by  multinationals are much given to the 
techniques of  scientific management. Professional competences appear 
to be narrow and practical, and not much accompanied by an analytical 
grasp of  the state of  the industry or the economy as a whole. If  these 
impressions are correct, the explanation is fairly obvious. The declining 
star of the textile industry has not for several decades held much glitter 
for the high flyer. University graduates are rare in textile management. 
Perhaps the major exception as a route for talent into the industry has 
been some of the top management of the larger groups who have come 
into the industry via chemicals and synthetics, but even in those groups a 
large proportion of  middle management entered the industry via family 
firms which were subsequently taken over. 
11.8  The Diversification Option 
Courtaulds is exceptional in its shift of  emphasis away from textiles. 
Almost  universally among textile managers mention  of  Kanebb, the 
Japanese textile firm that has diversified into cosmetics, and the question, 
Is that possible here? produces dismissive answers. A senior manager of 
another of  the big three groups: 
We’ve never  regarded ourselves as being  anything but  experts in 
textiles. From time to time we’ve acquired other businesses inciden- 
tally, as part of takeovers-an  animal feed stuffs business recently- 
but we’ve always sold it off. 
The manager  of  the curtain-weaving mill now  losing out to the new 
stitch-bonded process: 
No.  We  never  thought  of  going  into  the  stitch-bonded  business 
ourselves. You say we’d have the advantage of knowing the markets, 
having the connections. But its not our trade to be doing that sort of 
thing. We’d have to turn ourselves into converters. It’s like asking 
Wedgewoods to make plastic cups. That’s ICI’s job. 
A parochial traditionalism is as responsible for this lack of hubris-or 
down-with-the-ship captain’s pride-as  a realistic appraisal of their own 
capacities. “See that row of  houses over there! My  great-great grand- 
father built those in the 1850s-with  inside bathroom too.” And as for 
parochialism,  hear  the  same  man’s  eloquence  about  the  hopeless 
peripherality of  Blackburn: to be sure he can get up at six and be in 
Frankfurt by ten, but that’s not the same as being in the German heart- 
land of  Europe where everything is happening. 306  Ronald P. Dore 
Only two cases of diversification  out of weaving have come our way in 
Blackburn. Mill 1  established a small knitting business in the later 1960s 
when it seemed that knitters were taking markets away from the looms. 
Another firm’s machine room developed a capacity for producing plastic 
extruders, and the firm has gone over to making fine-mesh plastic net by 
methods which won it a recent prize for innovation. 
Even within weaving, specialization was traditionally extreme: “A firm 
that did cloth for men’s trousers would never touch the women’s trousers 
business.” Now, however, most firms have had to accept that degree of 
versatility to survive. The converters are said also to have become more 
sharply contractual in their business attitudes, more willing to drop a 
regular supplier in favor of  a new one if the price is right. (But this is the 
first round of  hearsay, not yet cross-checked into a coherent story.) 
11.9  The Closure Option: Labor Relations 
We have not met a single person in Lancashire who does not think that 
it is wicked of the governments of Britain and the European Community 
(EC) to deny textile firms protection  and so force them into closure. 
Everyone concerned will always lobby for protection rather than face 
closure. We have seen, however, some of the reasons why the preference 
gap between the two alternatives-the  degree of desperation with which 
closure would  be  evaded-is  likely to be  different, for  example, as 
between a family firm and a large corporation. It is a matter of  some 
interest-in  view of what is generally considered to be a major source of 
rigidities in the OIC economies-to  ask how far the determination to 
avoid closure is enhanced by humane concern for the workers employed, 
as against the psychic or monetary  cost of  dealing with  attack from 
workers threatened with redundancy or their unions, as against the cost 
of  the consequent effects on the morale of  the workers left behind. 
As for sentiment, it is probably stronger in this industry than in many 
others precisely because of  the characteristics of  managers mentioned 
above: a good many of those in managerial positions began as office boys 
at fourteen or apprentices at sixteen, or  were the heirs of family firms sent 
to serve their time as apprentices with some of  the men whose masters 
they were destined to become. It is doubtful, however, if such sentiments 
play anything but a fleeting marginal role in decisions about closure. 
But  what  about the prospect  of  public uproar,  of  having the mill 
invaded by angry workers determined to sit in until the closure decision is 
reversed, the prospect of  bad publicity, much nervous strain, possibly 
damage to assets, or the cost of  legal action? 
Such events are commonly reported in the press from other industries, 
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of this type enters even marginally into calculations about closure in the 
textile industry.  Militancy is not the textile unions’ style. “It’s not  a 
question of them and us, really. It’s how we can keep the industry alive,” 
said one union official. “The employers do their best, and they’re very 
good really, though we have our little tiffs with them from time to time. 
But by and large we’ve the best of  relations with the Employers Associa- 
tion”-a  view that is generally echoed on the other side. When Mill 4  was 
closed, the unions succeeded in extracting from the firm an additional ex 
gratia payment to redundant workers of half a week’s salary per year of 
service (on top of  the statutory entitlement of  half  to one and a half 
week’s pay per year of service4epending on age-up  to a maximum of 
thirty weeks’ pay). This was spoken of by the unions as markedly gener- 
ous,  but the resultant  sum-in  total,  say, f2,500  for a fifty-year-old 
weaver with twenty years’ service-is  far below the sums demanded and 
received by the militant unions in shipbuilding and steel. A number of 
reasons explain this quiescence. 
1. The generally small size of  plant.  Five thousand  workers with 
12,000 votes have a much bigger chance of  attracting government in- 
tervention, even than the 850 workers of  Mill 4. 
2.  The nature of the union membership-older,  more female, more 
immigrant. 
3.  The fatalism induced by  long years of  steady decline. There is a 
great deal of  bitterness about the treatment given to textile workers in 
comparison with others. “Take steel workers or car workers. Why is it 
they get f5,OOO-even &15,000-whereas for us the absolute top limit’s 
under f3,000. They’ve been kicking textiles in the teeth ever since I’ve 
been in it. But if  the textile unions behaved the same way as the car 
unions, they’d just shut the whole industry down. How much British 
industry is there invested in Hong Kong, for instance? British titled 
people, too. All Tories of  course.” 
4. Textile workers have lived with the prospect of redundancy so long 
that redundancy has become part of  their accepted scheme of things, and 
the redundancy payment has been incorporated into their life-planning 
process. For many people who have lived frugal lives on weekly incomes, 
a lump-sum payment though not a large one in comparison with other 
industries-three  times, say, the cost of a holiday on the Costa Brava that 
you save up for for a whole year-is  not negligible. Women in their fifties 
with a long record of  hard work and dependability have not been too 
afraid of  being unable to find something to fill in the few years till their 
pension starts, and may even begin to fear that they will be “cheated of 
their redundancy” if  the firm fails to collapse before they reach sixty. 
5. Long years of  cooperation between unions and employers in their 
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pattern  of  cooperation. Employers were particularly willing to make 
accommodations in order to secure that cooperation during the periods of 
Labour Party rule when the voice of  the unions carried more weight. 
6.  One consequence of cooperation between unions and management 
is the automatic check off  of  union dues. This eliminates the weekly 
due-collecting need for contact between union member and official and 
thus reduces  information  flow and the sort  of  reverberatory process 
whereby grievances articulated become magnified. 
7. With steadily declining membership the (very very modest) salaries 
and expenses of  full-time officials are less and less covered by  current 
subscriptions, more  and more dependent on interest  from the funds 
accumulated in the days when membership was much larger. A strike 
which ran down those funds would mean the end of some of  the smaller 
unions. 
11.10  Who Suffers How Much? 
Our interviews with former textile employees are not yet extensive 
enough to support any very meaningful generalizations; only a few tenta- 
tive ones are possible. 
First, some samples of  the individual cases: 
1. Fifty-year-old widow, weaver, and lately warper (making up warp 
beams). Altogether she has had fourteen jobs, from four of which she has 
been made redundant (the last at Mill 9,  mostly as a weaver or warper, 
but with occasional spells as a machinist outside textiles and two spells at 
home during the infancy of  her two children. After thirteen weeks of 
unemployment she is waiting for a response to a job application (via the 
government Job Centre) to the local Ordnance Factory-which  would 
pay her more than her previous job. Through personal connections she 
has had two opportunities to work as a warper in surviving mills. In one 
the pay was not good enough. The other was a mill she “didn’t fancy”: it 
had a bad reputation. 
2.  Former general manager of  Mill 6. Started as an office boy, then 
chief clerk in a weaving firm which offered him the chance to do (practi- 
cal)  management  training-part-time  study  for  textile  diploma  plus 
varied work experience including a spell with a machinery manufacturer. 
In his subsequent career has had six mills collapse under him. Lives in a 
modest terraced house, talks with enormous enthusiasm about the tech- 
nicalities of his job (dashes to the kitchen to snip a square from his wife’s 
kitchen towel to help explain the construction of terry toweling) as of the 
steam engine, the running of which he had to combine with his general 
managership for the last six months of  the mill’s life, the driver having 
been incapacitated by  illness. Had heard of  a weaving manager’s job 
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weeks of job hunting sought refuge from a growing sense of uselessness  in 
a job as hospital orderly. 
3.  Fifty-five-year-old  widow, weaver. Has had only two jobs, each for 
twenty years; the last in Mill 6. No easy substitute available for that last 
job since she was allowed to come home during the day (a stone’s throw 
from the mill) to care for her bedridden mother and (only recently died) 
bedridden husband. Regrets losing the lively life of  the mill, but has 
decided not to work: her widow’s pension, her mother’s old-age pension, 
a disabled person’s attendant allowance and rate rebate provide enough 
to live on. 
4. Twenty-six-year-old Pakistan-born, English-educated male weav- 
er, made redundant at a Blackburn mill. Applied for a job at a local 
electronics firms early in the sixty-day-notice period  and was  finally 
offered one by the firm in the second week of  unemployment. 
5. Forty-eight-year-old  former  creeler-her  ninth  job interspersed 
with intervals for bearing four children. Earlier jobs had included that of 
machinist at the local Ordnance Factory: she applied to return (after a 
ten-year interval)  and was taken on as an inspector after six weeks’ 
unemployment. 
6.  Sixty-one-year-old works manager of  a mill  on the outskirts of 
Blackburn which closed early in 1979. In the ensuing six months he was 
privately offered one mill managing job but refused it because it involved 
working the two to ten shift at an ordinary day rate. He applied for 
another advertised job without success and finally, after six months, was 
offered  via  the government  Employment  Agency the job of  deputy 
manager at a skill training center for “difficult” youths. Has been de- 
veloping a small private brush-making workshop as a sideline. 
7.  Thirty-year-old man, started career as glassworks boy at age fifteen, 
became an overlooker’s apprentice, and after qualifying as a skilled man 
(supervisor, setter, and maintainer of looms) continued through a series 
of five part-time-study technical diplomas and a series of promotions to a 
works manager position, his fourth job in the textile industry. After some 
years of  desultory  and steadily more intensive “looking around” for 
prospects  of  getting  out of  an obviously declining industry,  he  was 
offered, largely through sports club associations, a job as a brewery 
salesman. He now has less responsibility, fewer and more gentlemanly 
hours for more money, and a company car. The mill he left has not yet 
closed. 
How much can one generalize? 
First, we need not grieve too much for the owners of capital who at the 
very worst have reasonably valuable land to sell, possibly a useful mill 
site, and machinery (though one admittedly manager rather than owner 
claimed that he would rather take &40 a ton for scrap than add to the 
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Second, the managers of firms within the larger groups are also reason- 
ably well cared for. One of the group’s management services division was 
said to have 322 executives at the end of 1979 whom it was trying to place 
within the group on the assumption that they would-with  considerable 
financial assistance-be  prepared to move to another part of the country. 
A high proportion of  these were expected, in fact, to move out of  the 
company, leaving only those the group proposed to promote in order to 
keep and (probably a larger number of) those who had so few alternatives 
that they were prepared eventually to accept a sideways or downward 
shuffle. 
Many managers and skilled supervisory staff of the smaller companies, 
however, just lose their jobs-and  often have considerable difficulty in 
finding alternatives.  The alternatives  they do find tend to give little 
satisfaction and to utilize not their very considerable technical or market- 
ing skills, but only their “leadership”  ability to give orders with some 
confidence that they will be obeyed. 
The  few younger skilled workers+.g.,  overlookers-still  in the indus- 
try have hitherto had little difficulty in finding other jobs, which often 
give them higher incomes-some  in engineering by virtue of  the intelli- 
gence and responsible work attitudes which got them their apprenticeship 
in the first place and were reinforced by  their subsequent skilled-man 
status. The deepening of the recession in mid-1980 was clearly reducing 
opportunities, however. 
Weavers and other nonapprenticeship (“semiskilled”) workers prob- 
ably have had and continue to have the greatest difficulty in finding work, 
particularly in recent months, though a few years ago at unemployment 
levels of  three percent or less they seem soon to have been absorbed. 
Older workers are not at a particular disadvantage in this market; the 
general opinion of employers is that they are more dependable. (Erosion 
of the work ethic? More family ties than younger people? Later cohorts 
of  semiskilled workers recruited from further down some putative gen- 
eral ability range?) A proportion of the women workers are marginal to 
the labor force: they work for supplementary family income and are 
noncontributors to unemployment insurance, not averse to taking several 
weeks holiday between jobs, and reliant on the grapevine for news of 
alternative  employment.  The  Job  Centre-the  state  employment 
agency-registers  all claimants of  unemployment insurance plus non- 
claimant job seekers who bother to turn to it for advice and news of 
vacancies (or retraining schemes of job search schemeetravel  subsidies 
to follow up vacancies in other districts. etc.). In November 1979, the 
ex-textile workers on the books were 225 men and 49 women; in February 
1980,384 men and 104  women. In the latest employment census available 
(June 1976; the June 1977 figures were not to be available until May 
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assumption that their proportion among actual job losers was similar they 
were  greatly  underrepresented  in  the  Job  Centre-registered  unem- 
ployed. They should have been 121 not 49 in November, 207 not 104 in 
February. 
Asians among the latter group face particular difficulties in seeking 
jobs, from prejudice, from actual communications difficulty in environ- 
ments where they may not have learned the particular vocabulary, and 
from diffidence about trying to break into occupations or firms in which 
Asians have not yet established a foothold. Their unemployment rate in a 
1977  survey, at a time when the general unemployment rate was 6.5 
percent, was 26 percent among heads of households and 21 percent for 
the whole labor force. A certain amount of outwork by their wives for the 
garment industry somewhat eases their families’ financial situation. 
So also, of course, does the availability of unemployment benefit and 
supplementary benefit,  as well  as drawings from the earnings-related 
contributory scheme, ease their load. The financial plight of the unem- 
ployed is very different from that documented for Blackburn by  the 
Pilgrim Trust in the 1930s (Pilgrim Trust 1938). Whether that also miti- 
gates the psychological effects is less certain. One overlooker describing 
his five weeks’ unemployment (which ended in his getting another over- 
looker’s job) spoke of  his loss of  confidence, his growing sense that 
nobody would want him anymore. But he found some consolation, at 
least, in the fact that he had enough money to do some photography and 
print his own color enlargements. 
Job-search  areas are usually very narrow  for the Blackburn  born. 
Moving house is considered an extreme measure, and a journey to work 
of more than a mile and a half is frequently seen as a great hardship. The 
immigrants are a good deal more mobile, but depend on their community 
grapevine rather than the government information service. A number of 
Asians were said, for instance, to have gone to work in Danish hotels 
through personal connections. 
11.11  Secondary Losers 
With only 10 percent of the labor force in textiles, the contribution of 
the loss of jobs in that industry to the increase in total Blackburn unem- 
ployment (the monthly rate rose from 1.8  to  2.3  percent in 1974 to 6.1-6.8 
percent in 1979) has been relatively small. There is consequently little 
awareness any longer of  textile decline as the central problem of  the 
Blackburn economy. The local community relations officers (particularly 
concerned with the hard-hit Asian community) and a borough councillor 
or two will join the textile employers and unions in delegations to the 
Department of Trade to demand protection, but the plight of the textile 
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changes in  the consumer  market  stemming from  textile fluctuations 
appear to have entered into the calculations, e.g., of  the chain store 
which recently opened a new up-market department store in the rede- 
veloped city center. 
11.12  The Lobby for Protection 
The actual pattern of  losses to individuals described above does not 
seem very  directly to affect the  strength  of  the protectionist  lobby. 
Lobbies, petitions,  protests are organized chiefly by the Textile Em- 
ployers Association and the unions. In terms of personal motivation, they 
are threatened not by any immediate loss of job (such as might be made 
up for by compensation schemes) but by a slow dwindling  of their raison 
d’Ctre and resource base. The Employers Association may have to dis- 
pense with a part-time secretary as a quid pro quo for getting its remain- 
ing members to pay increased dues. The knotter’s secretary hardly feels 
he can ask his hard-pressed committee to increase his f2 a week car 
allowance in line with inflation. Only the unions whose investments cover 
a large part of current outgoings are free from such pressure. 
11.13  Whither Do Resources Move? 
Former mills still provide (22-3  per square foot) factory space, and its 
availability has been a decisive factor in inducing the start-up of some of 
the small enterprises that have begun business in the last five years, 
though almost equally cheap (subsidized) sites on industrial estates have 
been an available alternative for a large number. 
Another example of direct transfers: a nest of four firms (manufactur- 
ing fine-tolerance deep-drawn pressings, electronic machine utilization 
recorders, prototype printed  circuits, and importing and customizing 
visual display units) was started out of capital gained by selling a family 
textile firm to one of  the large groups, out of  managerial experience 
gained within that same group, and partly out of a market for automatic 
loom-monitoring equipment, knowledge of  which had come from that 
experience. 
Such examples are rare, however. Our sample of  new or expanded 
firms is as yet small and unsystematic, permitting few generalizations, 
since information about the total population (and hence about the repre- 
sentativeness of  the firms we have found on a street-by-street research 
basis) is hard to come by. Three of  the fourteen new firms are utilizing 
relatively new technologies (the pressings, monitoring equipment, and 
printed circuit firms just quoted). Three adapt imports from technologi- 
cally superior foreign sources for the British market (computer visual 
displays, municipal service and heavy agricultural vehicles-some  of the 
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One, a carpet tufter, is in an industry of  which there is an expanding 
concentration in Blackburn-carpet making and tufting machine manu- 
facture-serving a market with higher income elasticities than textiles. 
Two-a  larger do-it-yourself supermarket and a furniture wholesale- 
retail business-were  specifically attracted by large, cheap areas of space 
in old mills. Others-a  jobbing steel fabricator, a department store, a 
firm making small electric motors and transformers, one making parts for 
commercial vehicle air brakes, and one making plastic blow mouldings- 
might have been located anywhere and owe their location to a variety of 
personal and idiosyncratic factors. 
As for overall shifts in employment, recent figures are not yet avail- 
able, but the 1973-76  figures reflect the familiar story of  the deindus- 
trialisation of Britain. Employment as a whole fell from 98 to 93 percent 
of  a roughly constant  labor force, but  the decline in  manufacturing 
employment was 9 percent rather than 5 percent. Increases took place in 
services (both “miscellaneous” and “professional and scientific” ser- 
vices, but with distribution stable and government services  falling slightly 
in absolute numbers-though  not in percentage of the employed) and in a 
small number of  minor manufacturing branches: paper, printing,  and 
publishing; timber and furniture; food, drink, and tobacco. 
Nearly all these firms have benefited from one or other of  the fol- 
lowing: 
-Twenty  percent grants toward capital equipment by virtue of the fact 
that Blackburn was an Intermediate Development Area. 
-A  regional employment premium, partial subsidization of new work- 
ers for an initial period (until 1977 only). 
--Small  industries employment premium, a similar scheme for small 
businesses only (after 1977). 
-Assistance  in finding, or improving, premises or rent subsidies, from 
the local authority, the regional Development Association, or the Indus- 
trial Estates Corporation whose brand new industrial estate premises are 
rented at not very much more per square foot than old mills. 
-An  equity contribution from the National Research Development 
Corporation (in the case of  the electronics firm). 
None of  them, however, was prepared to ascribe a very large role in 
their scheme of things to such assistance. One claimed to have refused to 
bother with the &600  he would have been entitled to as employment 
premium for his five-worker establishment on the grounds that it was not 
worth the paperwork and the dealing with intrusive officials. 
11.14  Adjustment Assistance 
The British  cotton textile  industry has once had  a  comprehensive 
reorganization  scheme (1959) which involved incentives for scrapping 
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and product innovation. The result, as documented by Miles (1968) and 
summarized by  Wolf  (1979), was that the reequipment  substantially 
compensated for the scrapping, the productivity increases and product 
innovation were insufficient to restore competitiveness, and the taste for 
protection grew on what had fed it. Import restrictions grew and have 
become a permanent feature. Few in Lancashire really expect the MFA 
to be allowed to lapse in accordance with the promises at its signing. 
Recently the textile industry has benefited from two additional forms 
of  protective subsidy, both general measures not specifically aimed at 
textiles. The Temporary Employment Subsidy was a measure for firms 
facing unprofitability owing to temporary trading conditions. They could 
claim a wage subsidy for a limited-but  renewable-period.  This gave 
firms every incentive to sustain production levels and compete by cutting 
prices, an effect which brought strong complaints of unfair subsidization 
from Europe. Overmanning was also encouraged, which conventional- 
ized labor practices that had to be “bought out” when business started 
again in earnest. In April 1979, as a result of  criticism, the scheme was 
replaced by the Short Time Working Subsidy, which paid up to 75 percent 
of  wages for days not worked by firms which cut back production by 
moving to short-time working if it could be shown that the alternative was 
large-scale redundancy. This was free of some of the disadvantages of the 
earlier scheme. 
The industry’s own demands for “adjustment” are, of  course, at best 
for “temporary” protection while it restores competitive profitability, at 
worst for permanent support. 
The political effectiveness of these demands is there for all to see. The 
question is whether less undesirable adjustment measures (undesirable 
from  the  value  assumptions  taken  in  this  paper) would  reduce  the 
strength and political effectiveness of the demand for the existing type of 
measures. 
Wolf (1979) discusses the effect of  genuinely temporary protection in 
inducing greater capital intensiveness which may restore competitive- 
ness, thereby maintaining production levels but with considerably re- 
duced employment-an  outcome which he disapproves of  on normative 
assumptions similar to those adopted here; i.e., it leads neither to the 
preservation of OIC  jobs nor to the increase in NIC exports. If, however, 
it genuinely does lead to very considerable productivity increases through 
product and process innovation and so restores competitiveness-if,  that 
is to say in terms of our earlier classification,  anA industry is transformed 
by a new round of innovation into a B industry-it  is hard to object to the 
process. (Though one might wonder what the NICs would do if  all the A 
industries could be rescued for the B category in this way.) In practice, 
however, although something of  this kind may well have happened in 
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even in Britain, the evidence that it has been  or could be a general 
phenomenon is lacking. The loss of jobs through increased capital inten- 
siveness is easy to document; the actual restoration of competitive prof- 
itability much less so since protection measures for a fixed term have 
generally turned out to be anything but nonrenewable. 
A form of  temporary protection for an import-threatened industry 
which might have better results is a degressive tariff tapering to zero in a 
fixed term of  years, the revenue proceeds of which are used only to pay 
for scrapping and exit compensation-for  the same product lines as the 
tariff applies to-not  for reequipment of  firms which elect to stay in the 
business. With a degressive tariff, the slide gets established at levels at 
which it still holds off imports. By the time it ceases  to do so and the threat 
increases, the degressive slide has an established legitimacy and it is hard 
for protesters to choose any rational point at which to cry halt. If  the 
compensation amounts-perhaps  with guaranteed minima backed by 
government  revenuewere to vary with  tariff  revenue income, this 
would encourage early exit and create an interest group directly con- 
cerned with maximizing imports. One of the principles implicit in such a 
measure is already embodied in the MFA’s provisions for an annual 
increase in quotas from Third World producers. 
Most of the adjustment measures discussed above are aimed at firms or 
workers.  We have seen that the real losers whom  nobody thinks of 
compensating (the full-time  paid organizers of the successful  lobbies!) are 
the officials of  the textile associations and unions. Why should these 
associations and unions not also be compensated for lost membership 
fees? 
How much of the compensation should go to  the owners of capital, how 
much to the workers? Take first the political argument: which is it more 
necessary to bribe?  In the British textile industry, as we have seen, 
worker resistance to closure is not a significant  factor in affecting manage- 
rial closure decisions, and union officials have their own reasons, not just 
(perhaps not primarily) their members’ reasons for wholehearted lob- 
bying for protection. The conclusion would seem to be that for textiles 
(not perhaps for steel or shipbuilding with more militant unions) the 
employers need  sweetening the more.  In equity terms,  the case for 
providing either party with compensation over and above that which is 
afforded by the country’s economic institutions to those made redundant 
or going into liquidation from  any other industry depends on one’s 
assessment of how far, given prevailing standards of the levels of  security 
and comfort governments ought to guarantee their citizens, owners and 
workers in import-threatened industries can be deemed to have a pre- 
sumptive “right” to expect protection. 
Supposing compensation is to be paid  to the losers, are there any 
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used to stimulate the growth of  employment capacity in the B and C 
industries and export capacity in the B industries? (Again, there is no 
reason in equity why the measures-in  Britain the considerable array of 
measures, see those  listed  above for firms, plus retraining  schemes, 
job-search travel schemes, home removal schemes for workers-which 
are generally available to promote these purposes should be available 
only to, or preferentially  to, those  coming out of  import-threatened 
industries. The proposition is: supposing considerable sums are going to 
be  paid  in  compensation  anyway, can  they  also be  diverted  to  this 
purpose without losing their compensating ([bribery] function?) 
Two possible devices exist. First, if  exit compensation is paid to a firm 
which gets out of a threatened industry, an additional premium could be 
paid if, instead of closing, it retains the firm’s identity and premises and at 
least some of its work force and switches to production of a new product. 
If  the society concerned is one like Japan where there is a belief in the 
ability of  government officials to pick winners, the premiums might be 
graduated to the desirability of  the industry entered. 
Second, redundant workers might be given a reemployment voucher. 
They give this to anyone who offers them a job, and their new employer 
can use each voucher as collateral for a capital equipment loan of  Ex.  If 
the employee is still with the same outfit after, say, twelve months, the 
voucher can then be cashed in, by the employer for y percent of &x.  The 
worker’s  compensation  is  in  the  form  of  enhanced  reemployment 
chances, but he might also be given a delayed cash compensation at the 
end of  twelve months, if  only to deter him from trying to profit directly 
from his ability to confer financial benefits on an employer by claiming his 
“cut.” Doubtless there are innumerable snags in this process, over and 
above the difficulties  of administrative verification. One obvious one is in 
terms of  the distinction between the B category, technological frontier, 
“Schumpeterian” industries and the C category, service, transport, con- 
struction, etc., industries. The reemployment voucher scheme attaches 
fixed sums of capital to workers, whereas it is to more capital-intensive B 
industries that one would wish to direct more capital, and more labor- 
intensive C  industries more labor. 
11.15  Conclusions 
The conclusions of what is primarily an attempt to describe the state of 
a declining industry over one six-month period cannot do much more 
than arbitrarily single out a few points for emphasis. 
A matured decline such as that of the British textile industry (steadily 
downhill for five decades) has certain particular features of  its own in 
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which distinguish it from greener candidates for decline. The large cor- 
poration does seem to respond more rapidly to signals betraying long- 
term trends than do family firms. An industry as tradition-bound  as 
textiles does find diversification extremely difficult and uncongenial. It is 
hard  to identify any factors which would  enable some of  the more 
innovative textile firms to stay internationally competitive without gov- 
ernment protection, except converters’ and industrial users’ preference 
for a reserve of fallback local supplies, ability to produce certain special- 
ized lines, and, in a few cases, art design superiority. (The possibility that 
the British industry is more “h~peless’~  in these respects than the industry 
of other OICs-and  the implications this has for intra-OECD  adjustment 
policies-will  be one focus of the Britain-Japan-France comparison that 
we hope to develop at a later stage of  our research.) Particular closure 
decisions are not much affected by worker resistance, though unions are 
important elements in the organization of  protectionist lobbies, and in 
any schemes for adjustment compensation the separate claims of unions 
and employers’ associations should be considered. There is room for 
experiment in linking compensation on one hand with degressive tariffs 
and on the other with the promotion of  a better  industrial structure 
through the channeling of  investments and employment creation. 
Notes 
1. Two-fifths  of textile employment was in the three largest firms and nearly two-thirds  in 
the largest ten (24 percent and 32 percent in France, which had the next highest degree of 
concentration) (Shepherd 1980). 
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Comment  J. David Richardson 
This is a refreshing and transparent paper, full of  apt anecdotes that 
should suggest new themes for analytical and empirical research, and 
instruct policy historians and reformers. The virtue of  a survey-based, 
representatively anecdotal approach is that it avoids the fallacy of decom- 
position-generalizing  from  the  aggregative  to  the  particular-that 
tempts us so often as economists. The disadvantage of such an approach 
is that its domain of application may be quite narrow. To illustrate by one 
caveat:  the textile industry in  Blackburn, Lancashire,  seems to have 
passed beyond decline into a moribund state; the United States textile 
industry, by contrast, is more accurately described as “threatened,” and 
parts of it are positively healthy. Certain features of the British industry 
might not therefore be generally characteristic of other nations’ counter- 
parts-among  others, its muted political activism and its resigned, fatalis- 
tic employees. 
A number of  findings in Professor Dore’s paper deserve highlighting 
and  comment. The first  is the remarkable length of  the adjustment 
process. The Blackburn industry has been losing out to foreign competi- 
tion for roughly fifty years. This is “too long” by any sensible normative 
measure I can imagine because it spans several generations of workers, 
most of  whom would have taken their first job in a clearly declining 
industry with their eyes open to its state. This raises the question of how 
other members  of  a society (or the government)  should weigh  their 
demands for compensation-did  not they have adequate warning? Or 
would not adjustment costs have been fairly small for a government 
program  that discouraged new  investment  and new hires in  such an 
industry  (especially of  the young)? Dore is  attracted  to government 
programs like this that promote exit and scrapping, and I would subscribe 
to his opinion. 
Such programs can presumably be made politically feasible by liberal 
employment of carrots (exit bribes) rather than sticks (entry barriers). A 
degressive tariff with revenues earmarked for exit carrots in the same 
industry is an appealing illustration suggested by Dore, an illustration 
bolstered by several examples of  Blackburn people whose impending 
redundancy payments affected their labor market behavior in a desirable 
way. 
This discussion raises a generalization that is implicit in many of Dore’s 
cases.  Compensation  schemes have  their  own  efficiency and  equity 
effects-effects that do not generally restore the allocation and distribu- 
tion that existed before the initial shock. Some of these are favorable on 
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standard  economic  grounds:  Dore’s  degressive tariff  is  an  equity- 
motivated bribe that also aids the adjustment process. Others are not so 
favorable: do not the losers from the effects of  compensation schemes 
have a right to compensation?. .  .  and then by precedent the losers from 
the compensation scheme to compensate the losers from the compensa- 
tion  scheme?. . .  and then. .  .  and then. . .  in  an endless and inefficient 
sequence of resource diversion away from production and toward suing- 
for-in  jury. 
Several  other  thought-provoking  findings  concern  differences  in 
motivation and personality of textile workers and managers. The most 
dynamic of the group seemed to be those in Romania, Turkey, Greece, 
and Portugal who, to illustrate, “responded more rapidly to the growing 
demand for denims and corduroys.” Presumably they were among the 
most ambitious and skilled workers in their society, and were attracted by 
a share of the rents being generated in the rapidly growing textile indus- 
tries of  the European periphery. Least dynamic were the workers and 
managers who  remained in  Blackburn  and who worked for smaller, 
family-run companies. They had the most severe burdens of adjustment, 
but they also had strong family ties to the area, a pronounced “walk-to- 
work  preference,”  and an aversion to working the  night  shift.  One 
cynically wonders to what degree they may have been chronic under- 
achievers, less deserving of  compensation than in need of  exhortation, 
counseling, and willingness to be reconciled with the consequences of 
their own nonpecuniary choices. In between these extremes fall British 
workers and managers of larger, publicly owned, multiplant companies 
who seemed ready to move both geographically and with respect to the 
type of  job taken. Their adjustment burdens seemed relatively minor, 
and hence also their need for compensation and government assistance in 
adjusting. Verifying and explaining such behavioral differences strikes 
me as a fruitful area for careful sociological and economic research. So 
does doing the same for family-owned versus publicly owned firms, small 
versus large, multiplant versus single-plant, etc. 
Professor Dore’s behavioral differences reinforced my own predilec- 
tion that multiplant, multidivisional firms have the institutional potential 
to arrange efficient intrafirm adjustment and generous compensation for 
their own displaced employees. That no such “private-insurance adjust- 
ment assistance” is practiced on any large scale to my knowledge I ascribe 
to the relatively recent advent of government programs along such lines. 
As experience with official  programs sours, I predict increased employee 
demands for firm-level adjustment assistance provisions in negotiated 
contracts, and increasing corporate willingness to oblige as long as paral- 
lel contract provisions alleviate moral hazard problems that may develop. 
I would differ with Dore in a few places, for example, with his implicit 
approval of government programs to encourage diversification by firms 
being pressured by imports. Diversification in this paper denotes shifting 320  Ronald P. Dore 
of a firm’s efforts toward new product lines. The problem with this is that 
it can indenture workers and managers to an institutional shell that was 
revealed by the market already to be comparatively unsuccessful. (If it 
had been a successful firm, diversification would presumably have been 
profitable for it without government encouragement.) There seem to be 
few economic reasons for preserving institutions, especially unsuccessful 
ones, in contrast to preserving the skills and well-being of individuals. So 
it is arguably more efficient on economic grounds to allow firms to die 
rather than to diversify, after which diversification does take place, but 
individual-by-individual  diversification by employees of the dead firm- 
into new skills, new responsibilities, and relatively more successful insti- 
tutional shells (firms). The upshot of  this argument is of  course to cast 
doubt on the wisdom of all government programs aimed at the survival of 
firms rather than their exit. It also forces me to demur at Dore’s (tongue- 
in-cheek?) suggestion that textile associations and unions need institu- 
tion-preserving compensation, too. 
Finally, I was surprised at how easy was the typical adjustment of most 
individuals and firms profiled-even  in the absence of  government assist- 
ance. Many workers switched industries and acquired new skills without 
official assistance or protracted periods of  unemployment, even those 
who seemed least ambitious, skilled, and mobile. Some workers even 
switched countries, moving to comparable or better  positions in  the 
Sudanese and Philippine textile industries. And while firms took advan- 
tage of government assistance when offered, “None of  them. .  . was pre- 
pared  to ascribe a very large role in  their  scheme of  things to such 
assistance.” Indeed, it does only a little violence to this excellent paper to 
characterize it as documenting a history of  gradually successful private 
adjustment and questionably successful official efforts to ease that adjust- 
ment. 